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Water Policy 17 (2015) 162–186

Specially invited opinions and research report of the International
Water Law Project: global perspectives on the entry into force of
the UN Watercourses Convention 2014: part two
Gabriel Eckstein1 (Editor)
E-mail: gabrieleckstein@law.tamu.edu

Abstract
From the Editor-in-Chief, Dr Jerome Delli Priscoli: This is the second part of a research report on opinions of
prominent international water lawyers from each continent on the potential impacts of the 1997 UN Convention on
the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses. The first part of the report was published in Water
Policy 16(6).
Keywords: International water law; Watercourses Convention

Introduction to the series
The following compilation is reproduced and adapted from a series of essays that appeared in the blog
of the International Water Law Project (www.internationalwaterlaw.org). The series was solicited in
preparation for the coming into force of the 1997 UN Convention on the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses. The Convention had been pending for 17 years since its adoption by the United
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in 1997. On 19 May 2014, Vietnam became the 35th party to the
treaty, bringing the total number of State Parties to 35, the minimum number of ratifications needed to
bring that Convention into force.
In anticipation of this long-awaited occasion, during the summer of 2014, the International Water
Law Project hosted a series of essays on its blog (www.internationalwaterlaw.org/blog/) from some
of the most knowledgeable scholars and practitioners worldwide. The series provided unique perspectives and information on the implications of the Convention for international water law and the global
1
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management of transboundary watercourses. The outcome was a fantastic, provocative, and timely compilation that offered readers both an introduction and unique insight into the Convention. It also offered
readers the opportunity to participate in the discussion and offer their own perspectives and opinions by
submitting comments on the various essays. While the essays have been included in the following compilation, the readers’ comments can be found on the International Water Law Project Blog.
The International Water Law Project is itself a unique institution. Existing solely on the Internet, the
website is one of the premier resources and clearing houses for information on international water law
and policy. Its purpose is to educate and provide relevant resources to researchers and the public and to
facilitate cooperation over the world’s freshwater resources.
1. Professor Patricia Wouters2 on considering China’s approach to the UN Watercourses
Convention – time to revisit?
One of China’s riparian neighbors, Vietnam, was the 35th country to ratify the 1997 UN Watercourses
Convention (UNWC), catalyzing its entry into force on 17 August 2014. What does this mean for China
and this region? While China voted against the UN Resolution adopting the UNWC in 1997, this does
not tell the whole story. Instead, China’s transboundary water resources’ management must be considered
within a broader context, and as part of a continuum of China’s evolving approach to international law.
1.1. Setting the context
With 5,000 years of history, China has considerable experience in water resources’ development. Yet
China’s diminishing quantities and qualities of fresh water pose serious challenges to the nation’s burgeoning economic growth (China Water Risk website). In recent years, this has led the government to
include ‘water’ in its ‘Number One priority’ annual policy documents, instruments that drive Chinese
national policy actions. Premier Li Keqiang’s ‘war on pollution’ has also resulted in a range of measures
targeting water pollution, especially in urban areas and development hubs (China, 2014 No.1 Doc).
These domestic initiatives will have a critical impact on China’s transboundary water practice.
Situated as the upper riparian in some 40 major transboundary watercourses with 14 riparian nations (see
Figure 1), China has adopted an approach to transboundary water resources’ management consistent with
its ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity,
mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit,
and peaceful coexistence. Each of these principles aligns directly with core values of the UN Charter.
Recently, President Xi Jinping commemorated the sixtieth anniversary of the five principles and reaffirmed
China’s commitment to furthering this approach with a view to building ‘a new type of international
relations and a better world of win–win cooperation’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, 2014).
China already implements this foreign policy strategy, with proactive outreach across Asia, Europe, Africa,
and Latin America, concluding an impressive array of mostly bilateral agreements. As just one example, during
his Latin American visit (described as opening ‘a new chapter in China–Latin American win–win cooperation’
(Yushan, 2014)), in his address to Brazil’s National Congress, President Xi spoke of the need for ‘international
2
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Fig. 1. China’s transboundary waters. Source: Wouters & Chen (2011).
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fairness and justice’, and urged adherence to principles contained in the UN Charter (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of China, 2014; YouTube, 2014). While he reiterated the integral importance of national sovereignty
and territorial integrity, he added that there must be due regard for the reasonable concern of others. Referring to
China as a ‘peace-loving nation’, President Xi asserted that China opposed all forms of hegemony, adding that
‘China cannot develop without the world and the world cannot develop without China’.
1.2. China’s position regarding the UNWC
China’s refusal to support the UN Resolution adopting the UNWC was aligned to its approach to international law. It was in this context that the Chinese delegate explained China’s dissatisfaction with the text:
‘First, it failed to reflect general agreement among all countries, and a number of states had major
reservations regarding its main provisions. Second, the text did not reflect the principle of the territorial
sovereignty of a watercourse state. Such a state had indisputable sovereignty over a watercourse which
flowed through its territory. There was also an imbalance between the rights and obligations of the
upstream and downstream states …China could not support provisions on the mandatory settlement
of disputes which went against the principles set out in the United Nations Charter… [China] favored
the settlement of all disputes through peaceful negotiations. Accordingly… [China] voted against the
draft resolution to which the draft convention was attached’ (UNGA Press Release GA/9248, 1997).
Notably, however, during the deliberations leading to the Convention, China expressed strong support
for many of the norms eventually included in the UNWC, especially the principle of equitable and reasonable use (UNGA Sixth Committee, 1996). Moreover, a recent study examining China’s transboundary
water treaty practice suggests that, in general, China’s actions respect the approach of the UNWC
(Chen et al., 2013). The research, however, also revealed that, while China embraces the duty to cooperate
(as a general guiding principle) and supports the rule of equitable and reasonable use in its water-related
treaties, these norms are often expressed in broad terms. Also, the mechanisms for transboundary
cooperation provided for in China’s treaties – rules of procedure, institutional mechanisms, and dispute
settlement – are rather imprecise and focus primarily on technical issues. In addition, while the treaty practice lacks any compulsory or third-party dispute-settlement provisions, such an approach is consistent with
China’s view that differences should be managed through consultation, dialogue and negotiations.
1.3. Contemporary transboundary water issues involving China – the case of the Mekong
A recent article in the Financial Times (Clark, 2014) highlights China’s upstream dilemma – how can
China be the ‘good neighbor’ on the Mekong? China is only a dialogue partner under the Mekong
Agreement, with observer status at Mekong River Commission (MRC) meetings. However, under an
agreement with the MRC, China provides the Commission hydrological data on its portion of the
river (see Figure 2). Nevertheless, downstream riparians recently alleged that China’s dams were responsible for downstream flooding (December 2013) and scarcity (February 2014).
Without clear rules of procedure (such as those set forth under the UNWC and the Mekong Agreement), China’s duty to cooperate lacks normative traction.
China has a unique opportunity in the field of transboundary waters for consolidating its emerging role
as a ‘good neighbor’ that seeks ‘win–win’ solutions. Improved procedural rules and dispute-avoidance

166

G. Eckstein (Editor) / Water Policy 17 (2015) 162–186

Fig. 2. The Mekong River Basin. Source: Ti Le-Huu & Lien Nguyen Duc.
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mechanisms, developed to meet the regional context, could facilitate improved transboundary cooperation.
With its considerable technical expertise, China could devise its own ‘people-to-people’ approach for
enhanced transboundary cooperation.
1.4. China’s future approach to transboundary waters – the need for consolidation, including revisiting
the UNWC as a framework instrument
Things are changing. China is now well placed to develop its approach to transboundary water
cooperation in ways that match its global foreign policy strategy. The UNWC, as a multilateral framework instrument, offers a range of rules and processes that China could adapt to meet its diverse
transboundary issues in ways that demonstrate China’s role as the ‘good neighbor’. By incorporating
some of the provisions and processes included in the UNWC in its existing and future treaty and
state practice, China could move forward in this field. China appears to be heading in this direction,
as demonstrated by its recent 2013 Declaration with Kazakhstan, which builds on past bilateral treaty
practice and enlarges the Sino-Kazak joint commission’s remit to include work on water allocation.
Borrowing from the UNWC, China could also find legal approaches that contribute to its ‘war on pollution’, in the transboundary context, by introducing more detailed substantive and procedural rules aimed
at water pollution. In this regard, China might also take inspiration from the UNECE Convention on the
Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (1992). China’s support for
the UN (generally), coupled with its currently evolving approach to international law, provides compelling
reasons for China to revisit the guidelines provided for in these two UN global water conventions.
China’s emerging role in international development can also serve to enhance its approach to transboundary water cooperation. For example, China’s new ‘peace-through-development’ agenda with India
(Cohen, 2014) could help to build upon the series of recent transboundary water agreements between the
two countries (Ramachandran & Krishnan, 2014).
China’s commitment to environmental protection (evidenced in China’s participation in a broad range
of multilateral environmental agreements, such as the RAMSAR Wetlands Convention (Convention on
Wetlands of International Importance (RAMSAR Convention), 1975), Convention on Biological Diversity (1993), Climate Change Convention (UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1994), and
Convention on Desertification (UN Convention to Combat Desertification, 1996)) also provides opportunities for consolidating its approach to transboundary water cooperation.
Realizing the ‘Chinese dream’ is an ambitious goal. The peaceful management of China’s considerable transboundary water resources, in ways that are mutually beneficial to China and its riparian
neighbors, must be part of this major undertaking.

2. Professor Gabriel Eckstein3 on the implications of the UNWC for groundwater resources
With Vietnam’s accession to the 1997 UNWC, the global community has taken an important step
toward cooperative riparian management of transboundary waters. Although most scholars and
3
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UNWC parties have focused on the surface water implications of the Convention, there is another critical component of the instrument that should not be neglected. The UNWC applies to many aquifers
worldwide. The purpose of this essay is to consider the scope of the Convention in relation to groundwater resources and place it in the context of emerging international law for transboundary aquifers.
2.1. Groundwater – a hidden treasure
Groundwater is the world’s most extracted natural resource. It provides approximately 45% of humanity’s freshwater needs for everyday uses, such as drinking, cooking, and hygiene, and 24% of water used
in irrigated agriculture (Margat & van der Gun, 2013).
Not surprisingly, groundwater is highly transboundary. While 276 international watercourses traverse
the world’s land areas, an ongoing study identified 448 aquifers and aquifer bodies traversing international political boundaries (International Groundwater Resources Assessment Centre (IGRAC),
2012) (see Figure 3). In places such as the Middle East, North Africa, and the Mexico–USA border,
transboundary aquifers serve as the primary or sole source of available fresh water for human and
environmental sustenance.
Despite their importance, transboundary aquifers have been comparatively ignored in cross-border
water management and treaty development. While thousands of agreements have been forged for transboundary rivers and lakes, only a handful directly apply to aquifers that traverse international frontiers.
As one of the few international instruments to address this topic, the UNWC provides critical recognition of the important role groundwater resources play in human progress and development, as well
as the need to establish principles of law governing this ‘hidden’ but valuable natural resource.

Fig. 3. Transboundary aquifers of the world – 2012. Source: International Groundwater Resources Assessment Centre (IGRAC) (2012).
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2.2. Applicability of the UNWC to groundwater resources
Although the UNWC clearly applies to many of the world’s groundwater resources, it is important to
delineate precisely which aquifers are included and excluded from the rubric of the Convention. The
UNWC defines ‘watercourse’ to mean ‘a system of surface waters and groundwaters constituting by
virtue of their physical relationship a unitary whole and normally flowing into a common terminus’
and an ‘international watercourse’ as ‘a watercourse, parts of which are situated in different States’. Parsing out this phraseology reveals a number of important qualifications.
For an aquifer to fall within the scope of the UNWC, it must be a part of a ‘system of surface waters and
groundwaters’. Use of the ‘system’ criterion in the definition implies an interrelationship between multiple
and interlinked water bodies. This assessment is supported and complemented by the subsequent definitional language that emphasizes the ‘physical relationship’ and ‘unitary whole’ of the system, and the
‘common’ characterization of a terminus. Hence, solitary transboundary aquifers – such as independent
fossil aquifers and rain-fed aquifers – are presumptively excluded from the scope of the UNWC.
It is noteworthy that subsequent to drafting the principles for the UNWC, the UN International Law
Commission (ILC) submitted a Resolution on Confined Transboundary Groundwater in which it commended states to be guided by the principles of its work product in regulating independent and
hydraulically unrelated transboundary groundwater resources (UNILC, 1994). This progressive recommendation was not incorporated into the UNGA’s final version of the UNWC.
In addition, a textual reading of the two definitions suggests that the Convention applies where the transboundary character exists in any part of the system. Hence, a domestic aquifer is subject to the UNWC if it
is hydraulically connected to a transboundary river. Similarly, an internal river would be bound by the
terms of the Convention if it is linked to a transboundary aquifer. This latter scenario, however, may be
subject to debate. In its Thirty-Second Session Report during its preparatory work to the UNWC, the
ILC asserted that ‘the main stem of a river traversing or forming an international boundary’ is the ‘core’
of a watercourse. Additionally, Ambassador Chusei Yamada, who served on the ILC during the drafting
of the UNWC and later as Special Rapporteur for the ILC’s Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary
Aquifers (Draft Articles), explained to this author in a private conversation that in its deliberations the ILC,
and later the UNGA, never contemplated applying the Convention where the transboundary character of
the system could not be found in a surface water body. Given that the qualification has yet to be considered
in state practice, it remains unclear how broadly it may be interpreted.
Another criterion affecting the UNWC’s applicability to certain groundwater resources is the phrase
‘flowing into a common terminus’. The criterion intimates that the interlinked water resources must
flow toward the same end-point to be subject to the Convention’s regime. The directional flow of rivers
and lakes, however, is generally described in two dimensions (from point X to point Y). In contrast,
groundwater flow is defined in three dimensions because its movement is dependent on local geological
conditions, which can vary throughout the aquifer. As a result, groundwater can flow toward a disparate
terminal point from that of a related surface water body. Moreover, while aquifers do sometimes terminate
at a single point, such as at a spring, it is more common for aquifers to discharge over an extended geographical area along the entire edge of the aquifer. Accordingly, the Convention does not apply to
aquifers that do not share a common terminus with hydraulically connected rivers and lakes (see Figure 4).
In summary, the UNWC does apply to groundwater resources. However, the Convention’s definitions
narrow its relevance to domestic and transboundary aquifers that are hydraulically linked to a transboundary
river or lake and that flow into a common terminus. They may also apply to transboundary aquifers that are
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Fig. 4. Model of a transboundary aquifer. Source: UN Watercourses Convention Online Users Guide.

hydraulically linked to an internal water body, so long as the interrelated surface and subsurface waters flow
into a common terminus. All other aquifers are excluded from the Convention’s regime (Eckstein, 2005).
2.3. UNWC, transboundary aquifers, and international law
While the UNWC is widely regarded as codifying customary international law, it draws almost exclusively from state practice related to the management and allocation of transboundary rivers and lakes.
This perspective is understandable as the bilateral and multilateral cooperative experience over transboundary groundwater resources is scant in comparison. Nevertheless, many of the norms contained
in the UNWC are equally (or, at least, similarly) applicable to transboundary aquifers.
A 2011 study suggests that the customary responsibilities most conspicuous in state practice include the
substantive obligations of equitable and reasonable utilization and of no significant harm (Eckstein, 2011).
The study also recognizes the existence of accepted procedural duties, including regular exchange of data
and information, generation of supplemental data and information through continuous monitoring and
related activities, and prior notification of planned activities. The latter obligation is considerably more general and less developed procedurally than is contained in the UNWC. Principles contained in the UNWC,
but which have yet to arise in state practice for transboundary aquifers, include norms related to ecosystem
protection and pollution prevention, cooperative management mechanisms, and the settlement of disputes.

G. Eckstein (Editor) / Water Policy 17 (2015) 162–186

171

In addition, the study identifies groundwater-specific concepts that, while logical, have yet to emerge in
state practice, including obligations related to protecting recharge and discharge zones.
In 2002, the UNGA tasked the UNILC with drafting principles of law for transboundary aquifers
based on trends in state practice and customary norms. The resulting Draft Articles are now before
the UNGA (Eckstein & Sindico, 2014). While the Draft Articles were modeled largely on the
UNWC, there are a number of noteworthy differences. The UNWC applies to certain transboundary
and some domestic aquifers as discussed above. In contrast, the Draft Articles apply to all transboundary
aquifers, regardless of whether they are hydraulically linked to any other water body (surface or subsurface), and to domestic aquifers that are hydraulically related to a transboundary aquifer. In addition, the
Draft Articles are tailored specifically for transboundary aquifers and include references and principles
related to protecting recharge and discharge zones, ensuring the functioning of aquifers, and aquiferrelated monitoring activities. If the Draft Articles proceed toward an independent legal instrument,
which is yet uncertain, the Draft Articles and UNWC will have to be harmonized.
2.4. Conclusion
The coming into force of the UNWC is a significant milestone in the evolution of international water
law. While the Convention’s applicability to certain of the world’s groundwater resources may be limited,
its growing acceptance and implementation signify the global community’s broadening commitment to
manage and utilize transboundary freshwater resources through peaceful and cooperative means. It also
recognizes and affirms transboundary groundwater resources as a legitimate topic of international law.
3. Robyn Stein and Georgina Mackenzie4 on the implication of the entry into force of the UNWC
for Southern African states
The Revised Protocol on Shared Watercourses (Protocol) of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) (2000) came into force in 2003. The original Protocol, concluded between SADC Member
States (Figure 5) in 1995, was revised to ensure that it reflected those of the then-pending 1997 UNWC.
With a few notable exceptions, numerous provisions of the Revised Protocol have identical counterparts in
the UNWC. As South Africa and Namibia are the only SADC states to have ratified the UNWC, it must be
asked whether the entry into force of the UNWC will have any impact on the implementation or content of
the SADC Protocol, and whether other SADC states might now be motivated to accede to the Convention.
3.1. Notable differences between the UNWC and the Protocol
Despite numerous Protocol provisions mirroring the UNWC, there are two fundamental differences
between the instruments.
3.1.1. Dispute-resolution mechanisms. Under Article 7 of the Protocol, Member States must ‘strive to
resolve’ disputes relating to the implementation, interpretation, or application of the Protocol amicably.
4

Ms Stein is director and attorney with Edward Nathan Sonnenberg, Inc. in South Africa where she specializes in water law
and policy. She can be reached at rstein@icon.co.za. Ms Mackenzie is a candidate attorney working with Ms Stein.
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Fig. 5. Countries in the Southern African Development Community. Source: Southern African Development Community
Member States: http://www.sadc.int/member-states/.

Otherwise, disputes must be referred to the SADC Tribunal. In contrast, the corresponding article in the
UNWC, Article 33, offers numerous dispute-settlement options, beginning with negotiations, followed
by mediation or conciliation through a third party, the use of joint watercourse institutions, submission
to arbitration, and adjudication by the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
Furthermore, under Article 33(3) of the UNWC, if the parties have not settled their dispute within
6 months, any party can unilaterally initiate impartial and compulsory fact-finding procedures. A
‘Fact-finding Commission’ comprising members nominated by all parties is thereafter required to
produce a report setting out findings and recommendations for an equitable solution. While the parties must consider such findings and recommendations in good faith, scholars suggest that they are
not bound by the pronouncement (Rieu-Clarke & Rocha Loures, 2009). In this sense, the Commission may be characterized as ‘compulsory conciliation’. This fact-finding procedure is one of the
significant provisions of the UNWC, and yet the most notable absence from the Protocol.
3.1.2. ‘Equitable utilization’ principle vs the ‘no harm’ obligation. Both the UNWC and the Protocol
oblige watercourse states to utilize shared watercourses in an ‘equitable and reasonable manner’ vis-àvis other riparians. Whether or not such use is reasonable and equitable depends on a non-exhaustive
number of social, economic, and environmental factors listed in both instruments. Each instrument

G. Eckstein (Editor) / Water Policy 17 (2015) 162–186

173

(Protocol Article 3(10)(a); UNWC Article 7(1)) obliges parties to take ‘all appropriate measures to prevent significant harm to other watercourse states’. The legal relationship between these two principles is
of extreme importance, and the precedence of one specific principle over the other has been deemed to
have wide-ranging implications (Malzbender & Earle, 2013).
It is now widely recognized that the UNWC gives precedence to the ‘equitable utilization’ principle
over the ‘no significant harm’ obligation and it is considered the ‘cornerstone’ of the UNWC.
This position is evident in the International Court of Justice’s endorsement of this preference in
the Gabčikovo–Nagymaros Project case (Hungary/Slovakia) (ICJ) (1997). In contrast, Protocol Article
3(10)(b) states that where significant harm is nonetheless caused to another watercourse state, the
responsible state must take appropriate measures to eliminate or mitigate such harm having due
regard for the provisions of Article 3(10)(a), which embodies the Protocol’s no-harm obligation.
Therefore, some have interpreted the Protocol to give preference to the no-harm obligation over the
equitable utilization principle (Malzbender & Earle, 2013).
While it may be argued that some Protocol provisions have been poorly drafted, two arguments support the precedence of the no-harm obligation in the Protocol.
Despite the express reference to the UNWC, the Protocol was never intended to mirror the UNWC.
This is evident in historical drafts and instruments as well as other notable differences between the two
instruments. Moreover, while the Protocol provides a substantial definition for ‘significant harm’, the
UNWC contains no comparable characterization. Arguably, inclusion of this definition in the Protocol
indicates that the drafters intended to harness the objective nature of this definition and its factual importance to the complex set of SADC transboundary water resource issues. As such, they sought to ensure
that the no-harm obligation prevails over equitable and reasonable use.
Stephen McCaffrey, a leading scholar of international water law, contends that the preference in the
Protocol for the no-harm obligation prevents SADC states from developing or using shared watercourses
in a manner that causes significant harm to other watercourse states – even if such use or development
were equitable and reasonable – unless the latter states consent to such use and development
(McCaffrey, 2001). While this precedence in the Protocol favors downstream watercourse states, the
UNWC’s structure has the converse effect.
3.2. Accession to the UNWC by other SADC member states
As the Protocol is largely based on the framework of the UNWC, more SADC states might have been
expected to have ratified the Convention by now. However, only Namibia and South Africa have joined the
UNWC. Two reasons might explain the hesitancy of the remaining SADC states toward the Convention.
3.2.1. Questioning the relevance of the UNWC. Article 3(1) ensures that pre-existing watercourse
agreements and states’ rights and duties arising from such agreements (including the Protocol)
remain unaffected by accession to the UNWC. All that the Convention requires is that states ‘consider
harmonizing such agreements with the basic principles’ of the UNWC. Furthermore, Article 33(1) gives
precedence to regional machinery where it exists (such as the Protocol) for dispute resolution. Therefore,
SADC states may feel that there is no urgency to accede to the UNWC.
3.2.2. Redundancy of instruments. The UNWC was intentionally designed as a framework convention
with basic principles and rules that can be used flexibly and inform inter-state watercourse agreements.
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It was always intended to be supplemented by more detailed agreements. The Protocol, with its connection to the UNWC, adopted a similar framework approach. Therefore, some SADC states might view the
UNWC as a duplication of the Protocol and regard membership in the Convention as a redundant undertaking (Rieu-Clarke, 2007).
3.3. Effect of entry into force of the UNWC on implementation of the Protocol
The origins of the UNWC reinforce one of the UNWC’s primary purposes – to codify and progressively develop the content of customary international water law (UNGA Resolution 2669, 1971).
McCaffrey asserts that the UNWC strengthens and clarifies customary international law principles governing international watercourses through its status as the most authoritative statement of the norms of
international water law, including the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization (McCaffrey,
2001). SADC states opposed to the precedence of the no-harm obligation in the Protocol might use
the UNWC to evidence customary international law’s preference for equitable and reasonable use.
This could create discord among SADC members and undermine the founding principles of both the
UNWC and the Protocol.
In contrast, SADC states that support the preference for the no-harm obligation in the Protocol might
contend that the UNWC merely codifies the normative principles of customary international law without
defining the core and content of the prioritization of equitable and reasonable use over the no-harm obligation. At issue is the extent to which the UNWC provides practicable guidance on how the precedence
will inform the drafting of effective shared watercourse agreements between states. Similarly, SADC
members may assert that notwithstanding the precedence of equitable and reasonable use in the
UNWC, alignment between the Protocol and the UNWC is unachievable until the UNWC offers
more guidance on how its normative principles can be given practical effect (Salman, 2001). This is
particularly evident where competing interests arise in circumstances of hydro-political conflict and
dire water scarcity, both of which are ongoing challenges within the SADC region.
This argument is reinforced by the nature of the UNWC as a framework instrument designed to
inform the structure of local and regional watercourse agreements. By allowing pre-existing agreements
to remain intact (Article 3(1)) and permitting adjustments to Convention provisions where required by
local circumstances (Article 3(5)), the UNWC can be tailored to specific watercourses. This feature,
however, may make some SADC states uncomfortable with the extent to which member states can
depart from the UNWC’s norms, and the degree to which such departures and varied interpretations
can be effectively managed.
3.4. Conclusion
Until more SADC states accede to the UNWC (which appears unlikely in the near future), the
coming into force of the Convention will have limited effect on the Protocol. The UNWC will provide
interpretive guidance to those Protocol provisions that incorporate the normative principles of customary international law embodied in the UNWC. In the absence of constructive and inclusive
engagements between SADC states and a central agency responsible for managing and implementing
the UNWC, it is unlikely that the UNWC will have a tangible influence on the Protocol for some time
to come.
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4. Dr Maria Querol5 on the UNWC and South America
4.1. Introduction
Although the 1997 UNWC has finally entered into force, not one South American country is among
its State Parties. While Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela voted in favor of its adoption at the UN
General Assembly, Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Peru all abstained. Paraguay
and Venezuela were the only states from the region to sign the Convention, in 1997 and 1998, respectively. Nevertheless, neither has made any attempt to ratify it.
Many arguments have been presented to justify this flagrant absence, mainly focusing on the concern
of South American states regarding challenges to their sovereignty over water resources flowing through
their territories. However, this is not the only factor to be considered when analyzing the region’s position on this topic.
4.2. Multilateral transboundary water treaties of South America
South American (see Figure 6) states have a history of concluding international treaties to regulate the
management of their shared watercourses. This long-standing tradition favors the implementation of
specific mechanisms and international water law norms over more general regimes. While most of
these agreements are bilateral, there are four exceptions: the Treaty of the River Plate Basin (1969),
the Agreement on the Guarani Aquifer (2010), the Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation (1978), and
the Agreement constituting the Tri-National Commission of the Pilcomayo River Basin (1995).
The Plate Basin Treaty entered into force for Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay on 14
August 1970. It operates as an umbrella for other more specific agreements, both bilateral and multilateral, that have been concluded with regard to particular transboundary watercourses within the basin.
Article VI of this agreement foresees the possibility that its Contracting Parties may conclude specific,
partial, bilateral, or multilateral agreements designed to develop the basin. Accordingly, the Guarani
Aquifer Agreement was concluded within the framework of the Plate Basin Treaty. Thus, the basin
is regulated with an integrated approach, both from a general and a more specific standpoint.
Transboundary watercourses are regarded in the region as shared natural resources. This view was
particularly emphasized by both Argentina and Uruguay in the 1975 River Uruguay Statute (Statute
of the River Uruguay, 1975) and reaffirmed in 2010 in the Pulp Mills case before the ICJ (Pulp
Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay) (ICJ), 2010). In this regard, Argentina argued in
its memorial to the Court that ‘[t]he shared nature of the River Uruguay is also apparent from the
fact that obligations are imposed on Argentina and Uruguay at an international level. The 1975 River
Uruguay Statute is actually a repository for th[ose] international obligations’. Those obligations comprise the rules of no significant harm, equitable and reasonable use, and prior notification. It is
important to bear in mind that these general norms are only applicable to the use and protection of
shared natural resources as long as the states sharing the resource have not implemented a more specific
conventional regime. Accordingly, Argentina also declared that while the River Uruguay Statute had
been concluded 22 years before the UNWC was adopted by the UNGA, ‘the Statute provides for the
5
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Fig. 6. South America international basins. Source: Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database Oregon State University
(2014).

establishment of a system of co-operation which is far more rigorous than that laid down by the
Convention’.
The Amazon Cooperation Treaty was adopted by Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Suriname, and Venezuela to promote equitable and mutually beneficial results in the Amazon
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territories under their respective jurisdictions. It entered into force on 12 August 1980. The no
harm rule and the reasonable and equitable principle are enshrined in Article I of the agreement.
The no harm rule is also implicit in Article XVI as it stipulates that the decisions and commitments adopted by the State Parties to the treaty shall not be to the detriment of projects and
undertakings executed within their natural territories, in accordance with international law. In
addition, Article V prescribes the rational utilization of the water resources of the Amazon
System. Periodic exchange of information between all the State Parties is also provided for in
Articles I, VII and XI.
By virtue of an amendment to Article XXII of the Amazon Cooperation Treaty, the Organization of
the Treaty of Amazon Cooperation was created with a view to further strengthening and ensuring the
more effective implementation of the goals of the Treaty. The existence of an international legal
entity directly regulated by public international law no doubt facilitates the realization of projects and
can provide guidance for the rational utilization and sustainable management of shared water resources
in the Amazon region.
Although the Amazon Cooperation Treaty does not prescribe a dispute, resolution mechanism, State
Parties can agree to submit their disputes to an arbitral tribunal or a permanent judicial organ such as the
ICJ. They can also resort to a political dispute-resolution method such as mediation or good offices. In
any case, states are always bound by the customary obligation to negotiate a solution to their disputes in
good faith.
4.3. Transboundary water management in South America
Unlike the practice in other regions of the world, discussions over shared water resources in South
America, more often than not, take place under a cordial atmosphere. Although information exchange
among states does take place in the region, the necessary data may be scattered around in different
institutions, in which case its collection can prove quite burdensome. With reference to dispute resolution, South American states have been resolving their issues through direct negotiations, and in
some cases, as between Argentina and Uruguay, through the ICJ. While progress has been made in
terms of cooperation and knowledge over the management of shared surface water resources, this
is not the case with regard to all shared groundwater. A first step forward has indeed been taken
with regard to the Guarani Aquifer, but further in-depth knowledge is necessary to provide a more
complete scenario of all the possible consequences of human action related to transboundary groundwater resources.
Currently, South American states do not appear to have an immediate interest in a universal framework treaty to regulate the management of their transboundary water resources. Rather, they would
prefer to continue resorting to their existing bilateral and multilateral agreements and to applicable customary norms in the absence of such treaties. They also count on international organizations to help
implement their preferred management regime, as is occurring in both the Amazon Basin and the
Plate Basin.
This does not mean that the UNWC will have no value to South America. To the extent that the Convention codifies general international rules, its norms are binding on all states of the international
community, including those of South America. In addition, the entry into force of the UNWC might
foster the development of new customary norms in areas not yet covered by the existing regional treaties
and could prove very influential in the interpretation of those particular treaties.

178

G. Eckstein (Editor) / Water Policy 17 (2015) 162–186

5. Richard Paisley and Taylor Henshaw6 on the 1997 UNWC from a North American perspective
5.1. Introduction
The nations of North America – Canada, Mexico and the USA (see Figure 7) – share a significant
number of international drainage basins and transboundary aquifers, comprising 16% of the world’s
transboundary river basins. The three countries have entered into various bilateral agreements with
their neighbors for the management and allocation of their transboundary waters. However, while
each voted in favor of the UNWC when it came before the UN General Assembly, none of them has
ratified the instrument. The objective of this essay is to critically consider the absence of these three
nations from the roll of the UNWC and to assess whether ratifying and implementing the UNWC
would be in the individual and collective best interest of all three countries.

Fig. 7. Transboundary watercourse basins of North America. Source: UN Watercourses Convention Online Users Guide.
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5.2. Perceptions
The three nations appear to be in no great rush to ratify and implement the UNWC. This may be due
to a perception that their international drainage basins are sufficiently managed without the UNWC:
long-standing bilateral institutions have been established to deal with various aspects of the conservation
and management of international drainage basins in North America.
Prominent among these mechanisms are the International Joint Commission (IJC) between Canada
and the USA, and the International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC) between Mexico and
the USA. The history and practice of the IJC and the IBWC provide a rich body of work to review,
which falls beyond the scope of this essay. Nevertheless, it is pertinent to mention some of the challenges the two commissions face, such as managing significant risks to water quality and quantity;
the linking of border environments to binational trade and associated agreements; new stresses on
public health and national economies; changes due to population growth and industrialization;
greater demands on shared resources; increasing emphasis on public and indigenous peoples’ participation in decision-making; greater value placed on non-traditional water uses, such as ‘in stream’
flows; and the imperative to establish ecosystem and active adaptive management approaches to
resource management.
In addition, both institutions have experienced recent changes to their constituencies with the increasing influence of environmentalists and economic, social justice, and sustainable development advocates.
As a result, ratification and implementation of the UNWC could help make both the IJC and the IBWC
more relevant by increasing the focus on, and energy devoted to, the more sustainable conservation and
management of transboundary waters and related resources in all three countries.
5.3. Substantive objections
Whether and the extent to which Canada, Mexico, and the USA have substantive objections to the
UNWC are not well known. This may be because such objections are masked by the fact that all
three countries were among not just the 103 countries who voted in favor of the UNWC, but also
the 38 countries to officially sponsor the UNWC.
On reflection, various substantive reasons may exist to explain why none of the three countries are
overly anxious to ratify and implement the UNWC. Mexico provides a good example. On the one
hand, Mexico probably favors the UNWC, in part, because the Convention provides a basis for cooperating over measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution, including from the USA, which is an issue of
great sensitivity to Mexicans. On the other hand, groundwater is tremendously important for Mexico
where many believe that the conservation and management of shared transboundary aquifers necessitate
a different international legal regime to that presented in the UNWC. More specifically, Mexico could be
disinclined to ratify and implement the UNWC until more clarity is provided regarding the relationship
between the UNWC and the emerging Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers. According
to Stephen McCaffrey (McCaffrey, 2009), such clarity, regrettably, may be a long way off and
‘will crucially depend on eliminating both the overlap between the draft and the UN Convention in
terms of the physical subject matter they regulate, and the notion of “sovereignty” over shared
groundwater, which should have no place in any set of rules governing the use, protection, and management of shared freshwater resources’.
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5.4. Constitutional politics
At the political level, the ratification and implementation of international treaties have become an
increasingly challenging undertaking in all three countries.
In Canada, the negotiation, signing, and ratification of international treaties are controlled by the
executive branch of the federal government. However, many international treaties, such as the
UNWC, deal with matters that fall under the provincial sphere of legislative jurisdiction pursuant to
the division of powers in Canada between the federal government, the provincial governments, and
First Nations (Sections 91, 92, 92A and 35 of the Canadian Constitution) (Constitution of Canada website: http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/const/). Also, according to Professor Emeritus of Economics and
Forestry at the University of British Columbia, Peter Pearse (Pearse, 1994),
‘A recurrent question in discussions about water management in Canada is “What is the role of the
federal government?” A stranger to these discussions might think, naively, that this is simply a constitutional question. But even a good constitutional lawyer can not give a crisp answer. To some
extent the question is a political one – “What does the federal government think its role is, at the
moment?” This changes.’
As a practical matter, this means that ratification and implementation of the UNWC in Canada would
likely trigger challenging and hard-nosed fiscal and other negotiations among the federal, provincial,
and First Nations levels of government. An analogous situation occurred when Canada was asked to
ratify and implement the Espoo Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary
Context (Espoo Convention).
In the USA, the legal situation regarding international treaties is somewhat different, but possibly
even more challenging. Under United States constitutional law, an international ‘treaty’ is an agreement
that has received the ‘advice and consent’ of two-thirds of the United States Senate and has been ratified
by the President (Kirgis, 1997). As a practical matter, given the increasing political polarization within
the United States Senate, obtaining the consent of two-thirds of Senate members for any multilateral
treaty, including the UNWC, would be exceedingly challenging.
Mexico is much closer to Canada constitutionally than to the USA, as Mexico constitutionally allocates
separate and exclusive spheres of authority to the states/provinces and the federal government. International
treaties must conform to the Mexican Constitution in order to be valid. However, many international treaties
address topics that in Mexico fall within the exclusive authority of the states/provinces. Seemingly, in practical terms, this means that Mexico may need to enact domestic legislation to transform international treaty
obligations into enforceable domestic law, which could be both time-consuming and expensive.
5.5. Champions
Another reason why the UNWC has not yet been ratified and implemented in Canada, Mexico, and
the USA is the paucity of champions at the political level in all three countries. This resonates with Niccolo Machiavelli’s observation in The Prince (Machiavelli, 1532):
‘there is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its
success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things. Because the innovator
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has for enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions, and lukewarm defenders in
those who may do well under the new. This coolness arises partly from fear of the opponents, who
have the laws on their side, and partly from the incredulity of men, who do not readily believe in new
things until they have had a long experience of them.’
5.6. Justifying the UNWC in North America
Despite the apparent obstacles noted above, there are at least three compelling reasons why Canada,
Mexico, and the USA should immediately ratify and implement the UNWC. First, ratification and
implementation will send a strong and important message to each other, and to the world community,
generally, that sovereign states have important rights and responsibilities when it comes to transboundary freshwater resources.
Second, the fact that Canada and the USA are variously both upstream and downstream of each other
and that the USA is upstream of Mexico will particularly and importantly help dispel any lingering misconception that the UNWC may be biased in favor of downstream or upstream states.
Third, Canadian, Mexican, and American support for the Convention could not be more timely, given
how the world community is currently struggling with the harsh realities of climate change and water
scarcity.
Ratifying and implementing the UNWC in North America would also demonstrate a wider acceptance of practice under the Convention as representing customary international law. In turn, this
could place the UNWC higher on various political agendas and could help lead to a more stable framework for transboundary water cooperation globally.
6. Dr Salman M.A. Salman and Professor Gabriel Eckstein7: concluding thoughts on the
implications of the entry into force of the United Nations Watercourses Convention
The preceding essays discussing and analyzing various perspectives on, and interpretations of, the
UNWC convey different, and sometimes conflicting, views and perceptions about the various principles
set forth in the Convention. Indeed, many of these differences arose in the very early years of the work
of the UNILC on the draft Convention, which began in 1971, and continued throughout to its conclusion
in 1994. These differences also dominated the two meetings of the UN Sixth Committee convened as a
Working Group of the Whole in 1996 and 1997, as well as the UN General Assembly meeting on 21
May 1997, which finalized and approved the Convention. Thus, the journey of the Convention over the
past 44 years has been quite turbulent and contentious.
As evident in the perspectives from Southern Africa and the Nile Basin, one of the most contentious
debates surrounds the relationship between the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization and the
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obligation against causing significant harm between upper and lower riparians. As evidenced in the
essays, this issue remains a focal area of debate, notwithstanding the efforts made to clarify the issue
during the Sixth Committee and UNGA meetings, and through the interpretations and elaboration of
the International Court of Justice in the Gabčikovo–Nagymaros and the Pulp Mills cases. A number
of lower riparian countries still view the Convention as biased in favor of upper riparians because it subordinates the obligation against causing harm to the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization.
Conversely, many upper riparians still believe that the Convention favors lower riparians because of
its separate mention of the obligation against causing harm. It is noteworthy that the three countries
that voted against the Convention (Burundi, China, and Turkey), and many of those that abstained,
such as Bolivia, Ethiopia, Mali, and Tanzania, are largely upper riparian states. On the other hand, a
number of lower riparians, such as Egypt and Pakistan, and those with mixed upper and lower riparian
geographies, including France and Peru, also abstained, concerned that the Convention favors upstream
riparians because it subordinates the no harm rule to the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization.
Of all these countries, only France is now a party to the Convention.
Although the SADC countries amended their Protocol on Shared Watercourses in 2000 to make it
consistent with the Convention, they tried to maintain parity between the two principles by subjecting
each to the other, thus keeping the actual relationship in abeyance and unresolved. The same concerns
seem to be a main reason for the South Asia countries’ reluctance to join the Convention.
It is true that the Convention does indeed subordinate the obligation against causing harm to the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization. Yet this should in no way be taken to indicate a bias in favor of
upper riparians. The principle grants each riparian a fair share for utilization, based, at least theoretically, on
some objective and widely accepted principles dating back to the Helsinki Rules of 1966 (Helsinki Rules
on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers (with comments), International Law Association, 1966).
The ICJ, in addition to buttressing and elaborating the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization,
confirmed, in the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros case, the perfect equality of all riparian states in the uses of
the watercourse, and the exclusion of any preferential privilege of one riparian state in relation to the
others. The ICJ noted that modern development of international law has strengthened this principle for
non-navigational uses of international watercourses ‘as evidenced by the adoption of the Convention of
21 May 1997 on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses by the United
Nations General Assembly’. The ICJ reconfirmed this elaboration in 2010 in the Pulp Mills case.
The interaction of the Convention with existing agreements seems to be another matter raising the concerns of some states, as noted in the perspectives from South America, North America, Southern Africa,
and to some extent Central Asia. Article 3 of the Convention asserts that it does not affect the rights or obligations of watercourse states arising from agreements already in force. Nonetheless, it asks the parties to
consider, where necessary, harmonizing such agreements with the basic principles of the Convention.
Some riparian states with existing bilateral or regional agreements appear to believe that the harmonization
formulation causes those prior agreements to be weakened, if not disregarded. Conversely, riparian states
left out of existing local and regional agreements criticize the Convention for not subjecting existing agreements to the Convention’s provisions and failing to mandate inclusion of all riparians in such agreements.
Both perspectives misconstrue the Convention. A close reading reveals that the Convention recognizes the
validity of existing agreements as well as the rights of riparian states in a shared watercourse that are not
parties to such local and regional agreements. This is the interpretation described in the essay discussing the
European perspective, which also acknowledges the complementary nature of a general framework instrument, like the Convention, and more specific bilateral and regional agreements.
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A third contentious issue, raised most prominently in the essays presenting the Chinese and South
Asian perspectives and suggested in the South American perspective, relates to the Convention’s
dispute-settlement provisions. While some states, such as Pakistan, believe that the provisions are too
weak because they do not mandate a binding mechanism, other states, such as China, interpret the
fact-finding procedures as being compulsory and argue that such an approach interferes with their sovereign right to select their own approach to dispute settlement. Indeed, Article 33 of the Convention offers
parties a number of methods for settling disputes. However, the only obligatory process set forth is
impartial fact-finding and a requirement to consider the fact-finding report in good faith. Thus, while
the Convention provides a basic mechanism for ascertaining the facts of a dispute, it leaves the precise
method for resolving disputes to the parties. Given that the Convention is a framework treaty, this is
clearly a reasonable approach, incorporating both points of view.
A fourth concern regards the Convention’s relevance to groundwater resources. As explained in the
essays providing the South Asian and North American perspectives, some countries, such as Mexico
and Pakistan, question whether the Convention’s regime should extend to subsurface waters. The
unease appears to be based, in part, on inadequate national information related to border-region aquifers
and the extent to which the Convention could fully address groundwater challenges, which often are
distinct from those affecting surface waters. The Convention, however, provides mechanisms for developing knowledge about hydraulically related water resources, including obligations to cooperate (Article
8) and share information (Article 9), and even to generate new knowledge (Article 9). Furthermore, it
would be illogical to impose the Convention’s regime on water resources whose relations to a transboundary watercourse are still unclear. Nevertheless, with the advent of the Draft Articles on
Transboundary Aquifers, which contain a number of noteworthy groundwater-specific provisions,
countries may be justified in raising questions regarding how the Convention addresses groundwater
resources. However, the issue should be couched more in terms of a concern rather than a contentious
matter preventing ratification of the Convention.
Notwithstanding the regional and subject-specific challenges and concerns, there is a clear consensus
that transboundary waters should be managed on the basis of cooperation and the equality of all riparians in the use of shared watercourses. Beyond these basic international law tenets, there are a number of
advantages that could accrue to nations that ratify the Convention. Foremost is the comfort and security
of knowing that riparian neighbors operate from the same foundational norms.
For example, under the Convention, all riparians – regardless of whether upstream or downstream –
must abide by the instrument’s detailed notification procedures before embarking on measures that may
affect an international watercourse. The Convention does not bestow a veto right on any riparian, but
rather requires interaction and communication in conformity with fundamental norms of international
law. As a result, riparians are prevented from taking unilateral action and are encouraged to cooperate
through various means, including notification.
The notification procedures can also benefit states to the extent that they offer greater certainty, security and comfort to the various international, regional, and national financial institutions about financing
projects affecting international watercourses. Agencies such as regional development banks and state
development agencies, which typically lack such procedures, now have a global instrument on which
to rely for project notification and processing.
Ultimately, as suggested in Dr McCaffrey’s essay in part one of this report, the Convention’s most
significant value lies in its status as an authoritative statement of customary international water law
and a framework under which more specific bilateral and regional agreements can be established and
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interpreted. In fact, the UNGA itself used the term ‘codification’ when it referred the task of preparing
the draft convention to its legal arm, the UNILC.
Hence, entry into force of the Convention represents a broadening commitment by the international
community to manage and utilize transboundary freshwater resources through peaceful and cooperative
means. Entry into force is also likely to have a ‘snowball’ effect of creating an incentive for other states
to join, as happened with other treaties, because few states would want to be left out.
Frontier freshwater resources have long been one of the few transboundary natural resources devoid
of a global framework treaty. With the UNWC, freshwater resources no longer carry that distinction.
Indeed, a new chapter of international cooperation over these resources has emerged.
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